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LEXECON INC. v. MILBERG WEISS BERSHAD HYNES

& LERACH: RESPECTING THE PLAINTIFF'S
CHOICE OF FORUM
I.

INTRODUCrION

In March 1998, a unanimous Supreme Court handed down a decision that ended what had been a common judicial practice in the
federal courts for nearly thirty years. That decision, Lexecon, Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach,' will have an immediate and
profound impact on the consolidation and adjudication of federal
civil claims that fall under the rubric of multidistrict litigation. In
short, the Court held that district judges who are designated under
the multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, to conduct the
consolidated pretrial proceedings of civil actions involving common
questions of fact, have no authority under the federal change-of-venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404,2 to transfer those cases to themselves for
triaL3 The federal judiciary had long ago created and approved this
practice by which a judge unilaterally transfers cases to himself for
trial, commonly known as "self-transfer." The purpose of the selftransfer was to enable greater efficiency and expediency in the adjudication of multidistrict litigation. 4 However, this exercise in judicial
"ingenuity" contravened the straightforward language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (§ 1407) which, as the Supreme Court held, requires the remand of all transferred cases to their originating district courts for
trial.5
118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994). Section 1404 provides: "For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
3 See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 964.
4 See In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 342 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D.N.H. 1971) (stating that self-transfer would be in
the interest of the "orderly and expeditious administration ofjustice").
5 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994). Section 1407(a) provides:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall
1

1338

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[V€OL. 74:4

Lexecon marks a victory for the right of the plaintiff, whose cause
of action is transferred for consolidated pretrial proceedings under
§ 1407, to have his case tried in the forum of his choice following the
conclusion of those pretrial proceedings. This presumptive right of
plaintiffs6 had, in many respects, been subordinated to countervailing

concerns of efficiency expressed by federal judges encumbered with
the demands of multidistrict litigation. Thesejudges began to make a
routine practice of self-transfer shortly after the enactment of § 1407
in 1968. 7 The judges cited their power under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(§ 1404(a)), which is often invoked during pretrial proceedings as a
means by which to effectuate the self-transfer. 8 Yet they overlooked
the fact that a consolidated trial is specifically precluded by the language of § 1407. Lexecon conclusively settled any existing interpretive
tension between the statutes-a tension that Congress, when it passed
§ 1407, never anticipated given its clearly expressed intent concerning
the limited purpose of § 1407 transfers. 9 Nevertheless, the practice of
self-transfer went unchecked for nearly three decades at the expense
of plaintiffs whose rights were subjugated to prevailing concerns of
efficiency and judicial economy.
Admittedly, the federal courts face an imposing, and sometimes
overwhelming, number of cases arising from events involving many
parties, such as mass torts or mass disasters.' 0 Yet it is imperative that
be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this
section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by
the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district
from which it was transferredunless it shall have been previously terminated
Id. (emphasis added).
6 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (stating that "the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed").
7 The seminal decision articulating the basic rationale for the ad hoc self-transfer of § 1407 cases was Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
8 See id. at 124.
9 There have been many commentaries over the years concerning the incompatibility of § 1404(a) self-transfers with the remand mandate of § 1407. See generally
Stanley J. Levy, Complex Multidistrict Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 FoPRDHAM L.
REV. 41 (1971); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 779 (1985); Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The JudicialPanel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711 (1991).
10 One author noted that more than 350,000 asbestos lawsuits alone had been
filed as of 1993, and that approximately 100,000 were on state and federal dockets at
the time. See Valle Simms Dutcher, Comment, The Asbestos Dragon: The Ramificationsof
CreativeJudicialManagement of Asbestos Cases, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 955, 955 (1993).
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a plaintiff's choice of forum be given the deference it deserves. The
legislative history of § 1407 clearly indicates that the drafters of the
statute recognized the need for efficiency and economy in the context
of multidistrict litigation, but not at the expense of the plaintiff's right
to trial in the forum of his choice. Congress agreed with the drafters
and enacted a statute which is an effective tool both for mitigating the
costs inherent in multidistrict litigation and for preserving this traditional right of plaintiffs. The federal judiciary's ad hoc expansion of
the scope of § 1407, while conceived with the good intention of easing
the burden of multidistrict litigation, was an ill-advised decision to do
that which Congress, after reasoned contemplation, wisely chose not
to do.
This Comment will first analyze § 1407, including the catalyst for
its drafting, and the legislative history of the statute which clearly outlines Congress' intent. As a practical matter, Lexecon ends the debate
concerning the question of remand under § 1407. However, the legislative history is especially relevant because it underscores the significance that Congress ascribed to plaintiffs' rights at the very time in
which it adopted legislation for the purpose of alleviating the burdens
placed on the federal courts by multidistrict litigation. In keeping
with its concern both for plaintiffs' rights and for judicial economy,
Congress set out four requirements that had to be fulfilled before
cases could be transferred for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings." Congress created and authorized the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (JPML)1 2 to make these transfer determinations. However, over time the JPML conflated the statutory guidelines
in a manner that elevated efficiency to a position of paramount consideration. Consequently, the JPML eventually sanctioned the use of
§ 1404 self-transfers by transferee judges.13 Part I will conclude with a
review of the flawed rationale adopted by the federal judiciary to justify the self-transfer procedure. Part II will examine Lexecon, including
its background and the lower court opinions leading to the Supreme
Court's decision in March 1998. Part III will discuss the significance
of the plaintiffs right to trial in his choice of forum. This right should
11

See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994).

12 See id. The JPML consists of seven federal circuit and district judges, of whom
no two may be from the same circuit. These judges are designated "from time to
time" by the ChiefJustice of the United States. The JPML requires the concurrence
of four judges to take any action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (1994).

13 The district to which actions are transferred for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings is the "transferee" court and is presided over by the "transferee"
judge. The "transferor" court is the court in which a transferred action is originally
filed and to which it must be remanded.
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be upheld both for the plaintiff engaging in simple litigation as well as
for the plaintiff whose case is one of many related multidistrict claims.
In its present state, § 1407 already imposes several actual and potential hardships upon plaintiffs whose cases are transferred for consolidated pretrial proceedings. The federal judiciary's assumption of selftransfer authority only served to exacerbate these hardships. Finally,
Part IV will address why Lexecon was correct and why Congress should
not amend § 1407 to allow the JPML to transfer cases for consolidated
trial. Although there is a strong public interest in efficiency and conservation of scarce judicial resources, the virtues that are inherent
within the respect that we have always accorded to a plaintiff's choice
of forum must not be discarded in our haste to achieve efficiency.
II.

ANALYSIS OF

A.

28 U.S.C. § 1407

The Legislative History

The catalyst for the creation and passage of § 1407 was the electrical equipment antitrust cases that flooded the federal district courts
during the early 1960s. These cases, some believed, threatened to retard the progress of the courts for years by creating onerous backlog
problems. 14 Following the criminal indictments of various manufacturers of electrical equipment, nearly 2,000 civil cases involving more
than 25,000 separate claims were filed in thirty-five federal districts. 15
Faced with this unprecedented number of cases, the federal judiciary
realized that, unless extraordinary procedures were adopted, judicial
effort would be needlessly duplicated and delays would be rampant as
the parties all sought the same discoverable information.1 6 In 1961,
the Judicial Conference of the United States voted to create what
came to be known as the Co-ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States District Courts. The Committee was
tasked with "considering discovery problems arising in multiple litigation with common witnesses and exhibits. 17T It thereafter resolved to
"suggest ways and means of handling the electrical antitrust cases,
from discovery through pretrial . .. "18 The Committee's efforts
".

14 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899; S.
REP. No. 90-454, at 3 (1967).
15 See S. REP. No. 90-454, at 3 (1967).

16 For a comprehensive discussion of the electrical equipment antitrust cases and
the actions taken in response to them, see Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel JudicialAdministration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621 (1964).
17 Id. at 623 (citing a January 26, 1962, letter of Chief Justice Warren to Judge
Edwin A. Robson, the vice chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee).
18 Id. (citing a resolution adopted by the Co-ordinating Committee).
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culminated in a national discovery program which substantially aided
in bringing all of the cases to conclusion by 1967. This discovery program included the use of national pretrial hearings and orders, national depositions of key witnesses, and national document
production by means of central document depositories. 19
Based upon its experience and success in managing the electrical
equipment antitrust cases, 20 the Co-ordinating Committee was
prompted by the Judicial Conference to draft the legislation that became § 1407.21 The objective of the legislation, as understood and
agreed on by Congress, was to "provide centralized management
under court supervision of pretrial proceedings of multidistrict litigation to assure the just and efficient conduct' of such actions."2 2 The
idea was that centralized management would minimize the "possibility
for conflict and duplication in discovery and other pretrial procedures
in related cases ... .,"23 Congress emphasized that § 1407 would affect
"only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation" and "would not affect the place of trial in any case." 24 It clearly demarcated "pretrial
proceedings" to be "the practice and procedure which precede the
trial of an action" and which "generally involve deposition and discovery. . ,,25 In its analysis of the features of the bill, Congress specifically noted that the legislation "requires that transferred cases be
remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings." 26 Without a doubt, the bill drafted by the Co-ordinating Committee and adopted by Congress contemplated only the
pretrial portion of factually related cases. This was due, in part, to the
fact that the experience of the Co-ordinating Committee with the
electrical equipment cases was "limited to pretrial matters," and the
Committee had not wished to exceed the "confines of that
27
experience."
19 See id. at 624-26.
20 ChiefJustice Warren observed that the electrical equipment cases were terminated in just over six years, a period of time "which would not be regarded as an
unusual length of time for the processing of a single complex antitrust case." Wilson
W. Herndon & Ernest R. Higginbotham, Complex MultidistrictLitigation-An Overview
of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407,31 BAYLOR L. REv. 33, 37 (1979) (quoting ChiefJustice Warren's
address to the American Law Institute on May 16, 1967).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1899.
22 Id. at 1899.
23 Id. at 1899-1900.
24 Id. at 1900.
25 Id
26 Id at 1901.
27 Id.
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Yet the breadth of the Committee's experience was not the only
reason for limiting the scope of § 1407 to pretrial proceedings. 28 The
Committee was keenly aware of the need to preserve the "benefits of
local trials in the appropriate districts." 29 In its comment recommending the proposed legislation, the Committee noted that the bill
was designed to "maximize the litigant's traditional privileges of selecting where, when and how to enforce his substantive rights or assert his
defenses while minimizing possible undue complexity from multiparty jury trials. 3 0° Congress unequivocally agreed with the Committee that it was best for all involved to have cases remanded to the
originating districts at the conclusion of coordinated pretrial proceedings. It too believed that "trial in the originating district is generally
preferable from the standpoint of the parties and witnesses. ....,,31
Additionally, it noted that "from the standpoint of the courts it would
be impracticable to have all cases in mass litigation tried in one
32
district."
As envisioned by Congress, § 1407 was designed simply to assemble cases sharing common questions of fact so that discovery and depositions could occur at one time rather than in repetitious succession
that would waste judicial resources and increase the likelihood of conflicting discovery. Once the pretrial proceedings were completed, remand to the transferor districts was necessary so that local discovery
33
proceedings could take place and trial could finally get underway.
Congress explicitly recognized that most cases would have additional
issues that could only be tried in the originating districts where necessary witnesses and evidence would be located.3 4 Moreover, it deemed
28 See Report of the Co-ordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation Recommending New Section 1407, Title 28 (Mar. 2, 1965), reprinted in In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 498-502 (J.P.M.L. 1968) [hereinafter Co-ordinating

Committee Report].
29 Id. at 499.
30 Id.The Committee asserted that the "major innovation" of § 1407 was the fact
that transfer would be "solely for pre-trial purposes." Id. It further emphasized this

innovation by drawing attention to the fact that because § 1407 was limited to pretrial
proceedings, it was not limited in terms of the district to which the cases could be
transferred. Hence, transfer could be made to the "most desirable forum" unlike
other venue statutes, specifically 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), which limit transfer to districts where the action could have been brought. I& at 499-500.
31 S.REP. No. 90-454, at 5 (1967).
32 Id. (emphasis added).
33 See id.
34 Hence its comment that "trial in the originating district is generally preferable
from the standpoint of the parties and witnesses." Id.
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a consolidated trial by the transferee judge to be "impracticable."35
This does not mean, however, that Congress believed consolidated
trial to be impossible. Rather, Congress recognized that the adjudication of all the cases in one district in a mass litigation could not be
achieved in a manner that would be fair to all involved and preserve
the rights to which plaintiffs are entitled. To be sure, Congress considered consolidated trial, but retreated from the idea noting: "If proposed section 1407 should be enacted and future experience justifies
extending it to include consolidation and coordination for trial purposes as well, only minor amendments to the present language of the
bill will be necessary. '3 6 Congress wisely chose to limit § 1407 to pretrial proceedings believing, as did the Co-ordinating Committee, in
the "benefits of local trials in the appropriate districts."3 7 Judicial
economy and efficiency would thus be realized within a practicable
framework that would necessarily inconvenience plaintiffs to some extent-by requiring them to engage in pretrial proceedings in the
transferee forum-but would ultimately preserve their indispensable
rights.
B.

The JudicialPanel on MultidistrictLitigation and the FederalJudiciary

As noted above, Congress created the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and empowered it to transfer cases for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.3 8 Under § 1407, transfer of civil
actions was made contingent upon the establishment of four requirements.3 9 Congress did not provide any real guidance for the JPML
with regard to the more subjective requirements-that transfer be
"for the convenience of parties and witnesses" and for the promotion
of the 'Just and efficient conduct" of the actions. 40 Consequently, in
35 Id.
36 H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.AN. 1898, 1902.
37 Co-ordinating Committee Report, supra note 28, at 449. The Committee also
noted in this report that one of the advantages of § 1407 "over alternative techniques,
such as the class action, is that each action remains as an individual suit with the
litigants retaining control over their separate interests." Id.
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994).
39 See id. The following four requirements must be established: (1) the civil actions in question must involve one or more common questions of fact; (2) they must
be pending in different districts; (3) the JPML must determine that transfer will be
for the convenience of parties and witnesses; and (4) the JPML must determine that
transfer will promote the "justand efficient" conduct of the actions. Id.
40 Congress instead intended to rely on "the informed discretion of the judiciary"
as the "best method for resolving questions as to when and where cases should be
transferred for pretrial." H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A-N.
1898, 1901.
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the years since its inception, the JPML has transferred some cases in
situations where transfer did not appear to be justifiable. 4 1 Both critics and supporters of theJPML have acknowledged this fact.4 2 As one

supporter noted, "few cases are denied MDL status for their failure to
promote just and efficient proceedings due to the Panel's favoring of
transfer. '4 3 Thus, rather than requiring that all the statutory criteria
be established, the JPML has largely exceeded the discretion given to
it by Congress and has placed efficiency as the paramount objective to
be achieved.4 4 In so doing, the Panel laid the foundation for the
45
proliferation of § 1404 self-transfers by the federal judiciary.
Taking their cue from the JPML, transferee judges hastened to
create a way to "improve" the functioning of § 1407. In Pfizer v.
Lord,46 a two-judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
heard a petition for a writ of mandamus. The writ was sought after a
transferee judge ordered transfer under § 1404(a) of all transferred
cases from the eleven districts in which they were filed to one district
for consolidated trial. 47 Although the transfer under scrutiny in Pfizer
was not a "self-transfer," the Second Circuit paved the way for the
41 See Levy, supra note 9, at 46-47 (criticizing the JPML for allocating greater
significance to the "just and efficient" criterion while virtually ignoring the other
requirements).
42 See, e.g., id. at 47 ("The Panel has assumed that transfer and consolidation will
promote judicial efficiency which will result in convenience to the parties and witnesses."); Hemdon & Higginbotham, supra note 20, at 43 (stating that, with regard to
the requirement that transfer be for the convenience of parties and witnesses, "the
Panel has largely eliminated this guideline as a determinative standard"); Richard A.
Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy, Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to
a Complex Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 467, 519 (1985) (noting with regard to the convenience requirement that the JPML has "deleted this requirement from its
standards").
43 Chesley & Kolodgy, supra note 42, at 520.
44 One of the first judges to sit on the JPML, Judge Stanley A. Weigel, discussed
extensively the process that the Panel should undergo in determining whether to order transfer. His concurrence in the case of In re "East of the Rockies" Concrete Pipe
Antitrust Cases, 302 F. Supp. 244, 253-56 (J.P.M.L. 1969), noted that in some cases,
including those that the Panel was then considering for transfer, "coordination and
consolidation may impair, not further, convenience, justice and efficiency." Id. at 254
(Weigel, J., concurring).
45 Typically, theJPML would suggest that its discount of the convenience requirement was justified since transfer was for pretrial purposes only and thus did not require the parties and witnesses to travel to the transferee district. See In re Asbestos
Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415, 422 (J.P.M.L. 1991); In reAir Crash Disaster Near
Chicago, Ill., 476 F. Supp. 445, 448 (J.P.M.L. 1979); In re Hawaii Hotel Room Rate
Antitrust Litig., 438 F. Supp. 935, 936-37 (J.P.M.L. 1977).
46 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).
47 See id. at 123.
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practice by side-stepping § 1407's clear remand mandate and holding
that the transferee judge's authority to transfer cases for trial under
§ 1404(a) was not limited by § 1407.48 Similarly, in a case decided just
two weeks prior to Pfizer, a transferee judge ordered a § 1404(a) selftransfer, rationalizing that a consolidated trial would save time and
49
money and foster overall judicial economy.

It is worth noting that the practice of self-transfer developed with
the full acquiescence of the JPML. In 1970, the Panel adopted Rule
15(d) of its Rules of Procedure5 ° which recognized the authority of a
transferee judge to rule on a § 1404(a) motion-a tacit ratification of
self-transfers. Later, in 1993, the JPML substituted Rule 15(d) with
Rule 14(b) which explicitly endorsed self-transfers pursuant to
§ 1404(a). 51
Notwithstanding the consensus of the JPML and the federal judiciary, the practice of self-transfer was a judicial invention.5 2 The legislative history of § 1407 clearly demonstrated that Congress never
intended for transferee judges to rule on § 1404(a) motions, let alone
48 See id. at 124. Specifically, the court said that § 1407 only limited the power of
the JPML which could not transfer cases for trial under § 1404(a). Conversely, the
transferee judge retained the same authority as he would have in any other case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 296. See id. The court said that its conclusion "would clearly
seem to comport with the essential purpose of section 1407 to 'promote the just and
efficient conduct' of complex multidistrict litigation." Id. at 125 (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a) (1994)). The court's paramount goal was clearly efficiency, irrespective of
the other costs involved-specifically those costs to the parties.
49 See In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 342 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D.N.H. 1971). DistrictJudge Bownes cited his active
involvement in the supervision of the pretrial proceedings, his familiarity with the
facts, issues, and problems involved in the case, and his duty to the expeditious administration of justice as reasons to transfer the cases to himself for trial. See id. He
also recognized that § 1407's clear language did not allow him to order a self-transfer.
Nevertheless, he concluded that such a transfer for consolidated trial was a "judicial
interpretation" that was developed "to meet the problems imposed upon the federal
courts by complex and multidistrict cases." Id. at 909.
50 TheJPML is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) to promulgate rules for the
conduct of its business, provided they are not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
51 Rule 14(b), Rules of Procedure of the J.P.M.L., provides in part: "Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee district court shall be
remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferredby
the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28
U.S.C. § 1406." Rule 14(b), R.PJ.P.M.L. following 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994) (emphasis
added).
52 See Air CrashDisasterNear Hanover,342 F. Supp. at 910 (commending the development of the self-transfer mechanism as "an excellent illustration of how the administration ofjustice can be advanced by an intelligent and imaginative judge").
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transfer cases to themselves for trial. 53 Such transfers stemmed from
the JPML's liberality with regard to transfer decisions coupled with
the prevailing belief of transferee judges that "the essential purpose of
section 1407 [was] to 'promote the just and efficient conduct' of complex multidistrict litigation. '5 4 Both the Panel and the judges were
convinced that § 1407 and § 1404(a) "should be used in concert to
55
effect the most expeditious disposition of multidistrict litigation.
Yet in their firm adherence to this belief, they overlooked the key
component of § 1407-the remand mandate-and the underlying importance of that component. Without a doubt, the judges were correct in their argument that § 1407 was intended to enhance the
efficiency of multidistrict litigation by eliminating repetitious procedures in related cases. But the statute was also concerned with achieving results that were both just and practicable, in short, results that
preserved the traditional rights of plaintiffs. 56 Congress had wisely rejected the option to authorize transfer for consolidated trial because it
valued both the rights of plaintiffs and the importance of just outcomes as much as, if not more than, the virtues of efficiency. As one
group of observers noted, "When Congress enacted the [multidistrict
litigation] statute, it exercised its prerogative to make difficult policy
choices and struck a specific balance between concerns ofjudicial efficiency and the rights of litigants. '57 The federal judiciary, having
overlooked the primary concern of § 1407, supplanted the will of Congress and struck its own flawed balance-one heavily tilted in favor of
an efficiency which might be wholly illusory. 58 In so doing, they compelled plaintiffs to litigate in forums not of their choosing as partici53 Congress did not preclude the use of § 1404(a) altogether. Rather, it concluded its discussion of the remand mandate with the observation that § 1404(a) "is
available in those instances where transfer of a case for all purposes is desirable."
H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1902. Congress, of
course, was referring to a § 1404(a) transfer ordered by the transferor, not the transferee judge. The Co-ordinating Committee made this clear in its Report where it
noted that § 1407 "would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude transfer
under other statutes (e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a)) prior to or at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings." Co-ordinating Committee Report, supra note 28, at 499
(emphasis added).
54 Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a) (1994)).
55 In re Koratron, 302 F. Supp. 239, 242 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 28-37.
57 Carter G. Phillips et al., Rescuing MultidistrictLitigationfrom the Altar of Expediency, 1997 BYU L. REV. 821, 822.
58 For an excellent discussion of the inconsistency of § 1404(a) transfers with
§ 1407, see Trangsrud, supra note 9, at 804-09. See also Noreen Dever Arralde, Comment, A Catalyst for Reforming Self-Transfer in Multidistrict Litigation: Lexecon, Inc. v.
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pants in consolidated trials over which they could exercise little
control and self-determination. As a result, plaintiffs were more likely
to suffer unfair treatment and outcome-changing consequences, both
of which would almost certainly have been obviated if they had re-

ceived their substantive right to remand pursuant to § 1407.

III.

THE LE EcoN DECISION

A.

Background

Lexecon emerged from the multidistrict securities litigation that
followed the collapse of Charles Keating's Lincoln Savings & Loan in
1989. In the vast class action brought on behalf of the purchasers of
securities issued by the failed thrift, counsel for the plaintiff class, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (Milberg Weiss), named Lexecon
Inc. as a defendant. 59 Lexecon, an economic consulting firm based in
Chicago, was alleged to have violated federal and state securities and
racketeering laws by knowingly misrepresenting to banking regulators
facts concerning the financial stability of Lincoln. 60 Due to the volume of litigation initiated by investors, the JPML transferred all of the
cases to the District of Arizona for consolidated pretrial proceedings
pursuant to § 1407.61 OnJune 22, 1992, Lexecon agreed to a "resolution" with the class attorneys whereby it was dismissed from the litigation in exchange for the professional fees that Lincoln Savings had
62
paid to Lexecon.
Subsequent to its dismissal, Lexecon initiated a suit against Milberg Weiss and other plaintiffs' attorneys for defamation and malicious prosecution. 63 Lexecon filed its action on November 25, 1992,
in the Northern District of Illinois. It alleged that Milberg Weiss had
sought to "destroy" Lexecon by involving it in the Lincoln Savings &
Loan litigation. 64 InJune 1993, Milberg Weiss petitioned theJPML to
transfer the case under § 1407 to the District of Arizona for pretrial
Milberg Weiss, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 623 (1998) (arguing that the factors relevant to a
§ 1404(a) transfer are unworkable within the multidistrict litigation context).
59 See In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 794 F.
Supp. 1424 (D. Ariz. 1992).
60

See id. at 1448-49.

61 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956, 959
(1998).
62 See In reAmerican Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav.& Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d
1524, 1529 (9th Cir. 1996). Lexecon wished the agreement to be termed a "resolution" rather than a settlement in order to protect its professional reputation. Id.
63 See id.
64 In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 845 F.
Supp. 1377, 1382 (D. Ariz. 1993).
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consolidation with the remaining Lincoln Savings cases. 65 The JPML
ordered transfer of the case to Arizona even though the judge who
originally presided over the consolidated Lincoln Savings litigation
and who was intimately familiar with Lexecon's dismissal from that
litigation had then recused himself.66 Following final settlement of
the last of the Lincoln Savings cases in March 1994, Lexecon unsuccessfully moved for remand of its case back to Illinois. 67 Lexecon renewed this motion in November 1994 after the completion of
discovery. 68 In April 1995, prior to ruling on the remand motion, the
judge dismissed all but one of Lexecon's claims. 69 Then, upon the
motion of Milberg Weiss, the judge self-transferred Lexecon's one surviving claim to himself for trial under § 1404(a). 70 Lexecon's petition
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus directing the transferee judge to remand the case to Illinois in accordance with § 1407's remand mandate was denied. 71 Thereafter, a jury
trial on the remaining defamation claim resulted in a verdict for Milberg Weiss. 72 Lexecon appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which in De-

cember 1996 affirmed, two-to-one, the districtjudge's self-transfer and
73
the verdict in the case.
65 See In re American Continental Corp., 102 F.3d at 1529.
66 See id. The judge recused himself because, upon hearing of Lexecon's lawsuit
against Milberg Weiss, he "arranged a telephonic hearing held on December 7, 1992,
and therein charged Lexecon with what he viewed as its incorrect portrayal of the
resolution of its role as a defendant in [the Lincoln Savings litigation]." i The
judge then placed an order in the record of that litigation which undermined the
validity of Lexecon's complaint against Milberg Weiss. See id The JPML's transfer of
the case to Arizona subsequent to the judge's recusal is especially curious because one
of the chief factors cited as a justification for transfer-judicial economy-could not
be realized. The judge familiar with the litigation was no longer involved. Furthermore, the case was transferred at a very late point in the multidistrict proceeding, in
fact, very near to its completion. Consequently, the Lexecon story is quite ironic given
the fact that, had the case not been transferred to Arizona by theJPML and then selftransferred by the transferee judge, it surely would not have culminated in a Supreme
Court decision that finally ended the practice of self-transfer under § 1407. Simply
put, no one could have prognosticated that such a radical result would come from
such an unlikely candidate.
67 See id. at 1531.
68 See id.
69 See In re American Continental/Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 884 F. Supp.
1388 (D. Ariz. 1995).
70 See In re American Continental Corp., 102 F.3d at 1531.
71 See Lexecon Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Ariz., No. 9570380, 1995 WL 432395 (9th Cir. July 21, 1995).
72 See In re American Continental Corp., 102 F.3d at 1531.
73 See id. at 1534-39.
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The Ninth Circuit'sAffirmance and Judge Kozinski's Dissent

In its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Lexecon stressed the remand
mandate of § 1407 which precludes a transferee judge from self-transferring a case for trial. 74 The court rejected this argument citing,
among other things, the frequency with which self-transfers occur, the
efficiency gains of self-transfer, and the JPML's Rule 14(b) authorizing self-transfers. 75 Judge Kozinski, who had dissented from the
court's 'prior decision denying Lexecon's petition for mandamus,
76
wrote a scathing dissent condemning the self-transfer procedure.
He argued that the infrequency with which transferred cases were remanded to their originating districts denoted "a remarkable power
grab by federal judges" who had created a "mechanism for systemati77
cally denying plaintiffs the right to trial in their forum of choice."
Judge Kozinski noted the clear language of § 1407 and the legislative
history indicating Congress's decision to limit the scope of transfer to
pretrial proceedings. 78 He attacked the federal judiciary's manipulation of § 1404(a), a statute which had been designed to protect a
plaintiff's choice of forum, as a means to effect self-transfers. 7 9 Finally, Judge Kozinski observed that the Rules of Procedure of the
JPML are promulgated without rigorous congressional oversight and,
being limited to the business of the Panel, can in no wise be invoked
to "broaden the transferee court's authority to act under section
14Q4(a). 80 In short, Judge Kozinski's dissent was a strongly intoned
message directed to. the Supreme Court, which received it and
granted certiorari.
C. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
'The only question before the Supreme Court was whether § 1407
permitted a transferee judge to transfer a case to himself for trial
under § 1404(a).181 The Court began by examining the language of
71i See id at 1533.
75 See id at 1532-33.
76 See id. at 1540 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
77 Id- Judge Kozinski cited the 1995 Report of the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. This report documented that theJPML had transferred 92,562 cases since 1968, and only 3,508 of these had been remanded for trial.
He did, however, note the transferee courts' ability to rule on dispositive motions
which might make trial, and hence remand, unnecessary. See id at 1544-45.
78 See id.
79 See id. at 1546-48
80 I& at 1549.
81 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956,
960-61 (1998). The Court ultimately did not rule on the question of whether
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§ 1407. Focusing on the requirement that "each action so transferred
shall be remanded by the panel," the Court observed that "the
mandatory 'shall' . . .normally creates an obligation impervious to
judicial discretion. '8 2 Despite the "longstanding practice" of the federal judiciary, this "plain command" could not be ignored. 83 The
Court also recognized that Congress had clearly distinguished the fact
that § 1407 applied only to pretrial proceedings. 84 Hence, no amount
of judicial creativity or legal argument could contort § 1407 into an
instrument allowing self-transfer for consolidated trial. 8 5 Transfer for
trial under § 1404(a) was not precluded, but it could only occur "after
'8 6
remand of the case to the originating district court.
Justice Souter wrote the opinion of the Court which was unanimous except as to the brief discussion of the legislative history of
§ 1407 from which Justice Scalia refrained. 8 7 On the whole, the decision was rather unremarkable as the Court simply engaged in a
straightforward textual analysis of § 1407. It did not address policy
concerns of efficiency, judicial economy, or fairness to plaintiffs. The
nearest the Court came to even mentioning these issues was in the
following glib, conclusory statement: "Milberg may or may not be correct that permitting transferee courts to make self-assignments would
be more desirable than preserving a plaintiff's choice of venue (to the
degree that § 1407(a) does so), but the proper venue for resolving
that issue remains the floor of Congress." 88 The Court's opinion was
short and seemingly detached from the thirty years' worth of debate
over the proper use of § 1407. What may in fact be remarkable about
§ 1404(a) permits self-transfer because it found that § 1407 requires remand of all
cases. See id,at 964 n.4.
82 Id. at 962 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994)).
83 Id. at 962. The Court also noted that § 1407 could not be parsed, as the Pfizer
court had done, so as to apply only certain provisions to the JPML, and certain provisions to the transferee courts. Rather the "central tenet of interpretation" holds that
"a statute is to be considered in all its parts when construing any one of them." Id.
84 See id. at 963.
85 See id,
86 Id. at 964. Given the straightforward language of § 1407, the Court declared
the invalidity of the JPML's Rule 14(b). See id.
87 See id. at 958.
88 Id. at 964. I should here note that the Court did, in analyzing the remedy to
which Lexecon was entitled, make brief mention of the interests that parties have in
choosing their own forum. See id. at 965. The Court made its comments in response
to Milberg Weiss's argument that the denial of Lexecon's right to remand constituted
harmless error and thus did not require remedy. Yet in rejecting this argument, the
Court focused more on the need to remedy statutory violations than it did on the
relevance of the issue of a plaintiffs choice of forum. See id.
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the Lexecon decision is the unremarkable way in which it effected such
a significant change in the landscape of multidistrict litigation.
IV.

THE P1rsuMIvE RiGrr OF PLAIrTwFs

A.

Introduction

Unlike Judge Kozinski, the Supreme Court in Lexecon did not discuss in any depth the right of a plaintiff to a trial in his choice of
forum. However, the Court did order reversal of the verdict for Milberg Weiss because Lexecon had been denied its substantially significant right to remand under § 1407.89 The Court's order was necessary
because, without it, § 1407's remand mandate would be meaningless. 90 Yet the order also underscores the considerable significance
and respect that our justice system has always accorded to the plaintiff's choice of forum. Section 1407 embodied this respect and manifested it in its remand mandate. In the judgment of Congress, there
could be no discretion on the part of either the JPML or the transferee judges with respect to the remand decision because the right of
the plaintiff to trial in his forum of choice was entitled to substantial
deference. 9 1 Congress did, of course, leave itself open to the possibility that transfer for consolidated trial under § 1407 might one day become desirable. 9 2 Yet in the thirty years subsequent to the passage of
§ 1407, in light of the extensive societal changes and the increased
caseloads of the federal courts, Congress never saw fit to amend the
statute. Nor should it do so now.
The reasons for attaching significance to the plaintiff's choice of
forum are as valid today as they have always been and should not be
discarded in favor of countervailing concerns of efficiency-an efficiency which may be actual or, in many respects, illusory. This is especially so with regard to the plaintiff engaged in multidistrict litigation
whose case is transferred under § 1407 for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such a plaintiff is confronted by a
number of variables that can temporarily wrest control of his case
from him. The exigencies of multidistrict litigation make this nearly
inevitable. Yet if the plaintiff's case is then transferred for consolidated trial, as was common prior to Lexecon, a number of factors arise
that can jeopardize the plaintiff's right to a fair adjudication of his
claim as an individual. Rather than having his claim adjudicated ac89 .See id at 965.
90 See id at 966.
91 See i& at 965.

92

See supra text accompanying note 36.
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cording to the law of his chosen forum, a skewed choice of law analysis
may effect an entirely inappropriate outcome favoring the defendant,
who initially moved for consolidation. Furthermore, contrary to being treated as an individual, the plaintiff is more likely to experience
indiscriminate treatment from judges seeking to achieve uniform
rather than disparate results. For the meritorious plaintiff, the consequences of this uniform treatment can be wholly inequitable and frustrating. Due to the aggregation of claims, a plaintiff may find a jury
trial to be unduly prejudicial in its treatment of his case. In sum,
there are a number of potential outcome-determinative effects that
are likely to be adverse to the plaintiff who is subject to a consolidated
trial. These adverse effects make the remand mandate all the more
crucial to the plaintiffs substantive rights.
B. The Significance of the Plaintiffs Choice

America's adversarial system of dispute resolution has long
respected the right of the individual litigant to oversee the management of his claim and the pursuit of his remedy. 93 This respect stems
from the notion that "litigation is a personal and individual enterprise. '94 In short, every citizen has a right to go to court for redress of
wrongs and, in so doing, to actively participate in the pursuit of his
remedy. 95 In accordance with these precepts of individual control,
American courts have consistently acknowledged an established principle-the forum chosen by the plaintiff is entitled to significant deference. 9 6 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this inveterate principle in
the case of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.9 7 There the Court stated that,

although a plaintiff may not be permitted to select an inconvenient
forum simply to oppress the defendant, in general "the plaintiff's
93 See The Fair v.Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("Of course,
the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon . . . ."); see
also Trangsrud, supranote 9, at 816-19 (discussing the historical notion of individual
control in the context of personal injury litigation).
94 Trangsrud, supra note 9, at 817.
95 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (referencing America's "deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court") (quoting 18
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417
(1981)).
96 See Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915) ("the plaintiff is
absolute master of what jurisdiction he will appeal to"). Although Healy involved
plaintiff's choice of jurisdiction-state or federal-the principle it articulated is no
less applicable to the plaintiff's choice of forum within the jurisdiction he has brought
his claim. Any doubts as to this fact are resolved by the Supreme Court's comments in
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
97 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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choice of forum should rarely be disturbed."98 The presumption in
favor of the plaintiff's choice can only be overcome if the balance
weighs heavily in favor of the defendant. 9 9 Absent an inappropriate
motive on the part of the plaintiff, courts have traditionally gone to
great lengths to ensure the plaintiff's right to seek relief in the forum
of his choice. 100
In addition to the individual's control over his legal strategy, the
adversary system grants certain rights to litigants, such as the plaintiff's
right to his choice of forum, with offsetting protections for the opposing party. The plaintiff is the "master of the complaint" and as such
maintains a considerable degree of control over the structure and
prosecution of his complaint. 10 1 In some respects, the American civil
justice system complements these managerial rights of plaintiffs, while
at the same time protecting defendants from abusive tactics. For example, the venue statutes have been "drawn with a necessary generality and usually give a plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be
quite sure of some place in which to pursue his remedy."'10 2 The
plaintiff, as a rational individual, may exercise this venue privilege to
his advantage and has the right to do so in pursuit of the most
favorable adjudication of his claim. At the same time, however, the
plaintiff is limited in terms of the venues in which he may bring his
98 Id. at 508. Although the issue in Gilbert concerned the applicability of the principle of forum non conveniens to the case at bar, nevertheless the Court's comments
are general in nature and relevant in all cases where the plaintiff's choice of forum is
contested. Moreover, the Court's opinion alludes to the notion that even where a
forum is inconvenient for a defendant, it should be upheld if it is "necessary to [the
plaintiff's] own right to pursue his remedy." Id.
99 See id.; see also Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970) ("It
is black letter law that a plaintiff's choice of a proper forum is a paramount consideration in any determination of a transfer request, and that choice.. . 'should not be
lightly disturbed.'") (quoting Ungrund v. Cunningham Bros., 300 F. Supp. 270, 272
(S.D. Ill. 1969)); Franklin v. Blaylock, 218 F. Supp. 261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (holding
that, in ruling on a § 1404(a) motion, the plaintiff's choice of forum is "entitled to
great weight" and "will not be disturbed unless the balance of convenience weighs
heavily in favor of defendant").

100

See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.6 (1986) ("Ju-

risdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced."); see

also David E. Steinberg, The Motion To Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 443, 463 (1990) ("Where a plaintiff has made a reasonable choice of
forum, a transfer motion is unlikely to succeed and only will impose an unnecessary
burden on both the plaintiffs counsel and the federal courts.").
101

SeeJAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, CoMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE AD-

vERsARY SYSTEM 87

102

(1998).

Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 507.
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action against the defendant. 10 3 He is also limited by the requirement
that his chosen venue have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 10 4 Given these controls placed on plaintiffs and the concomitant
protections afforded to defendants, if the plaintiffs choice of forum is
proper, that choice should be respected. Provided the plaintiff is not
motivated by a desire to oppress the defendant, the plaintiff certainly
need not seek to aid his opponent who, in turn, will rationally work to
undermine the plaintiff's choice. 10 5 Inconvenience to the defendant
is nearly unavoidable when the forum is not of his choosing.
There are some practical reasons as well for respecting the plaintiff's choice of forum that are frequently mentioned, but should not
be hastily dismissed. Congress alluded to these reasons when it considered the enactment of § 1407 while noting the benefits to be realized through local trials brought in the appropriate districts. 10 6 For
example, when a plaintiff chooses to litigate in his home forum, discovery may be conducted with greater ease and less expense as the
parties will presumably have ready access to both evidence and witnesses.10 7 A trial in a distant forum that is not related to the case,
however, will likely be more costly and entail greater difficulty in the
procurement of necessary witnesses.' 0 8 Moreover, there is a public interest in the adjudication of local controversies within the locality of
their occurrence. 10 9 The community whose laws are violated has a
103 See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183-84 (1979) ("In most
instances, the purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant
against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of trial.").
104 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting that the requirement of minimum contacts performs two functions, one of which
is to "protect [] the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum").
105 See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 101, at 87 (noting that one party will
often seek to thwart the other party's choices); see also Steinberg, supra note 100, at
464 (noting that "defendants appear likely to file a [§ 1404(a)] transfer motion almost as a matter of course when some colorable argument exists that an alternative
forum could prove more convenient").
106 See supra text accompanying notes 28-37.
107 See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508; see also General Foam Plastics Corp. v. Kraemer
Export Corp., 806 F. Supp. 88, 89-90 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting that plaintiff's choice of
forum is accorded substantial weight, especially where it is plaintiffs home forum, the
cause of action has a strong connection to the forum, and plaintiff's witnesses and
documents are present in that forum).
108 See Steinberg, supranote 100, at 480 (noting that a plaintiff may not be able to
afford the travel expenses of witnesses, and may not be able to compel hostile witnesses to attend a trial lying beyond a subpoena's reach).
109 See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 509 ("There is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.").

1999]

RESPECTING

THE PLAINTIFF'S CHOICE OF FORUM

1355

duty to seek the vindication of those laws and to impose the appropriate judgment on the violator. Members of the community will also be
in a better position to ascertain the loss suffered by one of their own
citizens and to remedy that loss accordingly." 0 The forthcoming
pages of this Comment seek to expound on the ideas briefly mentioned here, as well as others, to emphasize the significance that we
should continue to attach to the plaintiff's choice of forum.
C.

The Individual Plaintiffin the Realm of MultidistrictLitigation

The individual plaintiff who brings a simple cause of action in the
forum of his choice has certain expectations about the manner in
which his claim should proceed. These expectations are derived, in
large part, from the rational decisionmaking process that the plaintiff
employs when selecting the forum in which to bring his action. He
will often consider such things as "the substantive law of the possible
forums, the choice of law considerations involved in selecting the governing law, the quality of the judges, jurors and opposing counsel, the
status of court dockets, the expense of having to litigate in a distant
forum, and the need to have local counsel and how that affects control of the case.""" Having considered some or all of these factors in
making his decision, the plaintiff logically expects his case to proceed
with a relative degree of predictability.
Yet the plaintiff has other expectations regarding his case that are
not rooted in these factors. Rather, they originate in the fact that the
plaintiff has suffered some personal wrong and is now entitled to redress of that wrong. Simply put, a plaintiff is an individual with his
own story of what happened in the world that resulted in the necessity
to file a cause of action and to seek a remedy to which he believes he
is entitled. He rightfully expects to be able to tell his story, present
the issues, and receive an adjudication based upon the facts that are
relevant to him personally.
110 See id. at 510 (noting that ajury composed of local residents would be quite
capable of ascertaining the value of the goods lost by the plaintiff and the value of the
business lost by the plaintiff).
111 Levy, supra note 9, at 43. See also Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum
Choices in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction,41 Am. U. L.
REV. 369, 395-96 (1992) (noting that among the "main rationales at work in forum

selection" are the pace and cost of litigation, the desire to inconvenience one's opponent, and factors related to attorney convenience). Although this study focuses on
the reasons attorneys remove cases from state to federal court, its findings are instructive as to the strategic calculus in which plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys generally
engage when selecting a forum.
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These expectations are radically altered when the plaintiff becomes embroiled in the "vortex" of multidistrict litigation.1 1 2 A transfer under § 1407 for consolidated pretrial proceedings will markedly
curtail the amount of individual control that a plaintiff, and often his
attorney, has over his case. Moreover, it will increase the number of
conflicts he encounters. For example, it is not uncommon for a transferee judge-in an attempt to organize the pretrial proceedings-to
113
require the plaintiffs as a whole to file a consolidated complaint.
This can be a recipe for conflict and delay if there is dissension among
the plaintiffs as to whether such a unified complaint should be
filed. 1 14 Moreover, with the filing of a consolidated complaint generally comes the appointment of lead counsel 1 5 or committees of counsel 1 6 "who, as a practical matter, oust the attorneys chosen by parties,"
thus resulting in an alteration of "the procedural 'right' of civil litigants to select their own counsel."' "1 7 Although his appointment may
be a managerial necessity, the unfortunate reality is that the lead
counsel will usually have "very little familiarity with individual.., clients and their particularized claims."' 18 As a result, the indi112 This was the term used by Judge Kozinski in In re American Continental Corp.!
Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524, 1547 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
113 See Diana E. Murphy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints in MultidistrictLitigation, 132 F.R.D. 597, 598-600 (1991). Written by a federal judge with experience as a
transferee judge, this article provides insight into the factors considered by judges in
determining how best to manage cases transferred under § 1407(a), and how to deal
with the conflicts inherent in consolidation. The author advocates the use of a consolidated complaint.
114 See id. at 599-600, 602.
115 The lead counsel typically acts for all of the plaintiffs in "initiating and organizing discovery requests and responses, conducting the principal examination of deponents, employing experts, arranging for support services, and seeing that schedules
are met." MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.221 (3d ed. 1995).
116 Committees of counsel "may be assigned tasks by the court or lead counsel,
such as preparing briefs or conducting portions of the discovery program." Id.Appointment of such committees can lead to "substantially increased costs" as well. Id.
117 Joan Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the ProceduralRights of Litigants: What They Are, What The, Might Be PartII: Non-JurisdictionalMatters, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 967, 975 (1995). The author notes that courts have generally not been concerned by the fact that their appointment of lead counsel overturns litigants' choice
of counsel and "transform[s] the attorney-client relationship in potentially deleterious ways." Id. at 977.
118 Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial Paneh Transfer and TagAlong Orders Priorto a Determinationof Remand. Proceduraland SubstantiveProblem orEffective JudicialPublic Policy?, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 841, 863 n.171 (1993). The author questions the ability of a lead counsel to represent adequately all plaintiffs in the
transferee forum. See id. at 863.
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vidual plaintiff and his lawyer may have very little say about the
objectives and strategies that they would like to see employed in the
management of the pretrial proceedings which will bear on the development of the plaintiffs case.1 1 9 The "internal constraints" of case
management may "mak[e] it inevitable that the interests of individual
plaintiffs will be ignored or submerged in decisions concerning tactics
20
and discovery affecting the entire plaintiff group."'
Even if the plaintiff is not encumbered with the difficulties that
accompany the filing of a consolidated complaint and appointment of
lead counsel, the simple fact that he is in a forum not of his choosing
can seriously affect his case. For instance, "certain districts have different attitudes toward discovery problems.' u 2 Given the variety of discovery regimes that exist in individual districts, the plaintiffs case
could be significantly undermined or disadvantaged. 1 2 2 Moreover,
there is the crucial choice of law question which will be addressed
infra. There is also the factor of limited resources. As one observer
noted, "For a small player in a large litigation drama, consolidation
can raise costs drastically."' 2 3 All of these issues are relevant in the
context of multidistrict litigation, and they can affect the plaintiffs
case in crucial ways.
The sole consolation for the individual plaintiff is the remand
mandate of § 1407 which allows the plaintiff to retain some measure
of control over "the selection of the forum, the legal theories pursued
at trial, and the lawyer who actually represents him."' 24 Prior to Lexecon, however, matters could become far worse for the plaintiff if the
transferee judge self-transferred all of the cases for trial. Consolida119 See Murphy, supra note 113, at 602. The author refers to the case of In re
Wirebound Boxes, 128 F.R.D. 262, 263 (D. Minn. 1989), in which she served as the
transferee judge and had to deal with plaintiffs warring over the management of the
case. She notes that one group of plaintiffs favored consolidated pleadings arguing
that it would simplify management, while the opposing group questioned the surrender of claims or rights and future difficulties after remand back to the transferor
districts. See id at 602.
120 Trangsrud, supra note 9, at 823.
121 Levy, supra note 9, at 43 n.15.
122 Ponna Stienstra, Local Discovery Practices, in 8 CHARLES ALAN WRzIG-rT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PR.ACTICE AND PROCEDURE vii-viii (Supp. 1998). This useful resource provides the Federal Judicial Center's catalog of each federal district court's procedures
for discovery under FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
123 David Lauter, MasteringMDL, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 21, 1983, at 24 ("Sometimes it's
a disaster to be consolidated. You may have a fairly simple situation and get tied up
with a very complex case and be stuck for years in discovery.") (quoting attorney Laurence Greenwald of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan).
124 Trangsrud, supra note 9, at 823.
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tion for trial contrary to § 1407 would only exacerbate the hardships
detailed above. The plaintiffs traditional control over "the venue, the
lawyers representing him, the legal theories relied upon, and the strategy and tactics employed" would be rendered nugatory.12 5 In short, a
self-transfer decision could itself be outcome-determinative. 126 Congress, seeking to obviate such unwanted effects, included the remand
mandate in § 1407 to preserve the plaintiff's rights and to avoid depersonalizing the plaintiffs case. In the pursuit of efficiency and judicial
economy, Congress struck a clear balance, choosing to compel plaintiffs to surrender only some, not absolute, control. Unquestionably,
Lexecon was essential for the restitution of the rights of plaintiffs engaged in multidistrict litigation.
D.

Choice of Law and Illusory Efficiency in MultidistrictLitigation

In PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, 127 the Supreme Court ruled on the
appropriate forum for a wrongful death action involving one party
governed by Pennsylvania law and another governed by Scottish law.
The Court found that the Pennsylvania District Court had made a reasonable assessment of the problems inherent in such a case that warranted trial in Scotland; namely, the potential for confusing a jury
with two sets of law and the district court's own lack of familiarity with
Scottish law. 128 Although Piper had nothing to do with multidistrict
litigation, the problems faced by the Pennsylvania District Court are
illustrative of the very same problems created by the self-transfer procedure. These problems emanate from the choice of law analysis,
which, when coupled with cases consolidated for trial in the context of
multidistrict litigation, becomes a quagmire of inefficiency.
Under the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack 29 a claim that is transferred from another district court under § 1404(a) requires the trans125 Id. at 824.
126 I should here note that self-transfer decisions often were outcome-determinative in that many would result in settlement. See Mark Herrmann, To MDL Or Not To
MDL? A Defense Perspective, LrIGATION, Summer 1998, at 43, 47 (noting that a multidistrict litigation proceeding can foster settlement simply by bringing all of the parties
together into one place). While settlement is desireable, I will discuss infra the ways
in which settlement may be unfair when a meritorious plaintiff is forced to share in a
settlement with meritless plaintiffs.
127 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
128 See id, at 259-60. The Pennsylvania District Court also noted that it "would be
unfair to burden citizens with jury duty when the Middle District of Pennsylvania has
little connection with the controversy .... " Id. at 243-44.
129 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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feree court to apply the choice of law rules of the transferor court' 3 0
Hence, a transferee judge who self-transfers a number of cases to himself for trial must conduct a choice of law analysis for each of those
cases. To add to this complexity, "once the transferee court determines the applicable choice of law rules, it must apply the rules to
each precise legal issue involved in the litigation."'u 3 This means that
"the substantive law from several different states may govern the liability, compensatory damages and punitive damages.' u 3 2 As is evident
from this brief summary, self-transfer for consolidated trial can open a
veritable Pandora's box of complex problems that have the potential
to hopelessly confuse both transferee judges and, especially, juries trying to sort out the issues and the applicable law.' 3 3 The inevitable
result is prejudice to plaintiffs whose cases should have been remanded in the first place in accordance with § 1407.134 Furthermore,
any hopes that the transferee judge has for "orderly and expeditious
130 See id. at 639. The Court concluded that in cases "where the defendants seek
transfer, the transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law that
would have been applied if there had been no change of venue. A change of venue
under section 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of
courtrooms." Id. at 639. In Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 529 (1990), the
Supreme Court held that the Van Dusen rule is also applicable where the plaintiff
moves for a § 1404(a) transfer.
131 Desmond T. Barry, Jr., A PracticalGuide to the Ins and Outs of MultidistrictLitigation, 64 DEF. Couts. J. 58, 65-66 (1997).
132 Id. at 66.
133 Even if the judge is a managerial genius who writes incredibly articulate jury
instructions, the risk of jury confusion remains high and makes consolidated trial
impracticable. Judge Posner addressed the acuity of this obstacle that is faced by the
standard six-person federal jury which must reach a verdict while juggling a multitude
of laws. In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995), a class
action suit, he noted that such a jury "will receive a kind of Esperanto instruction,
merging the negligence standards of the 50 states and the District of Columbia."
Judge Posner concluded that in a high-stakes case with the fate of an industry in the
balance, the more favorable alternative is the submission of the issue "to multiple
juries constituting in the aggregate a much larger and more diverse sample of decision-makers." Id. at 1300. Another observer noted that in the trial of mass tort cases
where the liability issues present noncommon questions, "U]oint trial of the entire
liability question is then not practical" because "Ujiury confusion will inevitably result
if the court allows scores of individual plaintiffs to introduce evidence concerning
their particular experience." Trangsrud, supranote 9, at 826. Cf Phillips et al., supra
note 57, at 836 (observing that consolidated trials of complex cases pose the serious
risk of "jury overload" and hence "unfair prejudice" to the parties).
134 See supra text accompanying note 30. The Co-ordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation had foreseen this exact problem ofjury confusion arising from multiparty trials and had thus included the remand mandate in § 1407 which, if obeyed,
would obviate the problem entirely.
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administration ofjustice"' 35 may be effectively terminated by the need
to hold "a series of 'mini-trials"' on the relevant legal issues.13 6 The
efficiency to be realized by self-transfer for consolidated trial can thus
be illusory and may create more problems than it solves.
Given the complexities of the choice of law problem, some transferee judges who, prior to Lexecon, self-transferred cases for consolidated trial would often find a way to apply a single law to all of the
transferred claims or to each issue. 13 7 One conflicts of law scholar has
examined a number of examples, 138 nearly all of them in the context
of multidistrict litigation, where the transferee judges manipulated
the choice of law analysis in order to select that law-usually the law of
the state in which the court presided-which would be most convenient for them.1 39 This critic observed that choice of law analysis is
crucially significant because the decision to apply one law rather than
another can affect the outcome of a case.1 40 In short, under the regime of self-transfer, a plaintiff would be denied not only his choice of
forum but also, quite possibly, adjudication of his case under the appropriate law. Furthermore, knowing that cases consolidated under
§ 1407 were rarely remanded, defense attorneys could petition the
JPML to transfer all cases to a forum favoring the defense.14 1 Likewise, they could file a consolidation motion in order to escape an un135 In re Multidistrict Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover,
N.H., 342 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D.N.H. 1971).
136 Dutcher, supra note 10, at 975-76.
137 See Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547,
552-53 (1996) (noting that, with regard to cases in multidistrict litigation that have
been self-transferred for trial, "in practically every case, the court has found the same
law applicable under all the relevant choice-of-law approaches").
138 See id. at 553 n.16.
139 See id.
at 552-61. The author notes that the case of In re Air CrashDisasterNear
Chicago, Illinois, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981), serves as "a virtual 'how-to' manual of
ways to manipulate choice-of-law analysis." Kramer, supra note 137, at 554-55.
140 See id. at 554.
141 Technically, the Panel's stated position is that it is blind to the choice of law
issue. See In re General Motors Class E Stock Buyout Sec. Litig., 696 F. Supp. 1546,
1547 (J.P.M.L. 1988) ("When determining whether to transfer an action under Section 1407, however, it is not the business of the Panel to consider what law the transferee court might apply.") (footnote omitted). Nevertheless, a petition to the JPML
for transfer of one's case can be very strategic, and it certainly is highly relevant to
how the parties will manage their case. See Lauter, supra note 123, at 25 (noting the
candid comments of lawyers appearing before the JPML seeking consolidation of
cases in district courts with favorable appellate benches, and concluding that
"[f]orum shopping is an 'unspoken reason' behind many consolidation motions"); cf
Miller, supra note 111, at 437-38 (reporting that over one half of the defense attorneys in its study said that "the likelihood of more favorable appellate rulings in federal
court was a factor in case removal").
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favorable judge or jurisdiction, being confident that they would not
return for trial. 142 The proliferation of self-transfers thus created the
potential for forum shopping in the guise of efficiency. Lexecon, because it precluded self-transfer for consolidated trial in conjunction
with § 1407, preserved the plaintiffs' rights, and the integrity of the
system as a whole.
Brief mention must be made of the choice of law problem as it
relates to multidistrict cases arising under questions of federal law that
are transferred pursuant to § 1407 for coordinated and consolidated
pretrial proceedings. As discussed above, self-transfers for consolidated trial produced numerous difficulties for transferee courts because of their duty to apply the choice of law rules of the various
transferor courts in accordance with the Van Dusen rule. These
problems were as daunting for transferee courts presiding over cases
governed by federal questions as for transferee courts presiding over
diversity cases, with just as troublesome consequences for plaintiffs.
With regard to the former, the debate over whether a transferor
court's interpretation of federal law should govern a transferee court
came to a head in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983.143
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that,
because a transferee court was competent to decide federal issues correctly, its interpretation of federal law should be applied rather than
the differing interpretation of the transferor court.'4 The D.C. Circuit in large part rested its decision on its finding that the policies
advanced by the Van Dusen decision "do not figure in the calculus
when the law to be applied is federal, not state.' 45 The court realized
142

See Lauter, supra note 123, at 24 (noting that the motivations for filing consoli-

dation motions with the JPML include "searching for the most favorable federal circuit in which to hear a case ... and avoiding district judges with a reputation for
being unfavorably disposed toward a certain type of case").
143 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

144 Seeid. at1175. The plaintiffs in Korean Air Lines had made a motion for partial
summary judgment in which they sought a declaration that the defendant airline
would be liable without fault for compensatory damages without any limitation on the
amount of damages allowable per person under the Warsaw Convention treaty which

governed international air disasters. See id. at 1172. The transferee court had denied
this motion despite the fact that the precedent of the Second Circuit-the jurisdiction in which the majority of the plaintiffs had filed their claims-favored the position
advanced by the plaintiffs. See id.On interlocutory appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld
the transferee court's ruling and affirmed its interpretation of the Warsaw Conven-

at 1173.
tion which differed from that of the Second Circuit. See id.
145 Id. at 1174. The court noted that Van Dusen was based on the principles advanced in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which sought to "ensure
that the 'accident' of federal diversity jurisdiction does not enable a party to utilize a

transfer to achieve a result in federal court which could not have been achieved in the
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that, in so holding, it was effectively denying "to [the] plaintiff with a
federal claim, the 'venue privilege' [that the] diversity claimant enjoys." 146 Nevertheless, the court reasoned, "there is ultimately a single
proper interpretation of federal law," and because this is so, "the attempt to ascertain and apply diverse circuit interpretations simultane14 7
ously is inherently self-contradictory."'
In reaching its decision in Korean Air Lines, the D.C. Circuit made
a logically compelling argument. Furthermore, its goals were consistent with the goals of § 1407-to eliminate repetitive judicial effort.
Recognizing that on remand the transferor court would perhaps reverse its decision, the court suggested that the decision should be
binding as "law of the case," lest the efficiency goals of the § 1407
transfer process be for naught. 14 8 Yet, despite the apparent soundness
of the court's reasoning, the fact remains that the decision was at odds
both with the legislative history of § 1407149 and with the great weight
of the case law applying transferor law to federal question cases transferred under § 1407.150 The D.C. Circuit also supported its decision
by finding that most decisions transferred under § 1407 are not recourts of the State Where the action was filed." Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1174
(quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964)).

146 KoreanAir Lines, 829 F.2d at 1175. The court was also well aware that the plaintiffs in the case would fare much better if the Second Circuit's interpretation of federal law was applied rather than the D.C. Circuit's interpretation. See id.
147 Id. The court further noted that "[o]ur system contemplates differences between different states' laws .... But it is logically inconsistent to require one judge to
apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to
be a unitary federal law." Id. at 1175-76.
148 See id. at 1176.
149 See Ross Daryl Cooper, The Korean Air Disaster: Choice of Law in FederalMultidistrict Litigation,57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1155-59 (1989). The author analyzes the
legislative history of § 1407 noting primarily that Congress intended for transferee
courts to apply the Van Dusen principle to both state and federal law issues. In rebuttal to the argument that "Van Dusen was limited to state law issues in diversity cases,"
the author points out that:
Section 1407 was passed... in response to the complexities of the electrical equipment cases, which were complex federal antitrust cases. Because
all of the witnesses testifying before the subcommittee knew of this underlying purpose, it is illogical to assume that they were confining their comments [concerning the general application of Van Dusen] to state law issues
associated with Section 1407 transfers.
M at 1158. (footnote omitted).
150 In his concurrence in KoreanAir Lines, Judge Douglas Ginsburg acknowledged
a number of cases in which transferee courts applied the transferor court's interpretation of federal law pursuant to Van Dusen. See Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1177 n.2.
Judge Ginsburg criticized these decisions for their lack of adequate analysis concerning the state law-federal law difference.
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manded to their transferor courts at the conclusion of consolidated
pretrial proceedings. 15 1 Of course this never was, nor could be, a
valid justification for employing a potentially outcome-determinative
choice of law analysis. Although the D.C. Circuit raised a significant
point with regard to the need for uniformity in the interpretation of
federal law, "[m]any of the factors that entered into the calculus of
the court's decision... were misconstrued and misapplied."' 52 There
are, no doubt, instances in which one interpretation of federal law
must be applied. Obviously, this is so where the Supreme Court has
ruled on the proper interpretation. 5 3 Yet to give a transferee court
freedom to disregard the law of the transferor courts simply because it
is presiding over cases involving federal questions seems to open the
door to the same abuses and inequities previously discussed in the
context of transferred diversity cases.' 5 4 Lexecon and its proscription
of the self-transfer procedure in the context of § 1407 transfers should
go a long way toward impressing upon the courts the respect that
should be accorded to the plaintiffs choice of the law that he will rely
upon in vindication of his rights. This is contingent, of course, upon
§ 1407's continued existence in its presently effective and equitable
state.
V.

L-xEco. A VINDICATION
A.

OF CONGRESsIoNAL FoREsIGHT

Maintenance of § 1407(a) in Its Present State

Despite the calls for Congress to amend § 1407 to allow transfer
for consolidated trial, 5- the statute should remain unchanged. In its
present state, § 1407 is an effective tool for eliminating repetitive effort and reducing costs in multidistrict litigation.1 5 6 Those who call
for amendment of the statute often overlook this existing effective151 See id. at 1176 n.9.
152 Cooper, supranote 149, at 1166. The author concludes that the D.C. Circuit's
"dismissal of prior case law, its neglect of Congress' manifest intent for Van Dusen to
apply, and its reliance on the improper practice of courts using Section 1404 transfers
to retain cases that were transferred to them under Section 1407 all serve to undermine the propriety of the court's balancing as well as its ultimate conclusion." IL.
153 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Korean Air Lines decision and
affirmed the D.C. Circuit's decision in Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122
(1989). However, the Court only resolved the proper interpretation of the Warsaw
Convention. It did not address the choice of law issue.
154 See supra text accompanying notes 127-142.
155 See generally Rhodes, supra note 9, at 749-52; Arralde, supra note 58, at 649-52.
156 This fact is borne out by the example of the electrical equipment antitrust
cases, the successful management of which provided the framework for § 1407. See

supra text accompanying notes 14-27.
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ness, and argue that consolidation for trial will streamline cases and
provide faster resolutions. 157 In fact, the initiation of a multidistrict
litigation proceeding under § 1407 will inevitably consume a great
deal of time and is often a delaying tactic used by defendants.1 5 8 Additionally, the critics make efficiency arguments citing the "epidemic"
backlogs in the federal courts. 159 In fact, many of these arguments
concerning the efficiency gains of consolidated trial are not sup16
ported by reality.

0

Critics of the present § 1407 make many of the above assumptions in their elevation of efficiency as a paramount good. Transferee
judges made these same assumptions. However, in the haste to
achieve efficiency by means of consolidated trial, more harm than
good is often effected as plaintiffs are indiscriminately lumped together, judges overreach, and juries are overwhelmed by the mass litigation. In many respects then, any perceived efficiency beyond that
which is already achieved by the statute is illusory. In short, Congress
was correct when it said that transfer for consolidated trial would be
"impracticable."'161 It wisely struck a balance between efficiency and
plaintiffs' rights because it recognized the limits of the former and the
significance of the latter. Unlike transferee judges who self-transferred cases for trial, Congress was not willing to subordinate the
rights and interests of plaintiffs to an efficiency beyond that which was
157 See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking PlaintiffAutonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 809, 814
(1989). Interestingly, the author of this article makes the argument for speedy trials,
but concedes that consolidation can also create management problems and hostility,
both of which will only retard the progress of cases. See id. at 814.
158 See Herrmann, supra note 126, at 43 ("Creating an MDL proceeding will take
time. Five or six months can easily pass between the filing of a motion for coordination and the MDL Panel's decision whether to create a coordinated proceeding .

.

.

. Thus, by invoking Section 1407, a client initiates a time-consuming

process."); see also Miller, supra note 111, at 403 (noting the tactic of "opponent inconvenience" used by attorneys as a means to "erode the opposing party's willingness
to continue litigation").
159 See Freer, supra note 157, at 810. In fact, § 1407 provides more than adequate
efficiency. The Supreme Court noted in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956, 961 (1998), that out of 39,228 cases transferred under § 1407
and terminated as of September 30, 1995, only 3,787 ultimately required trial. The
vast majority then are terminated in the transferee courts either by settlement or by
means of dispositive motions.
160 See Levy, supra note 9, at 50 (noting that, With respect to aviation accident
cases, transfers simply for consolidated pretrial proceedings have often been surprisingly inefficient).
161 S. REP. No. 90-454, at 5 (1967).
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practicable and reasonable. Lexecon restored the realistic and equitable parameters that had prudently been set by Congress.
B.

The Individuality of the Plaintff

Lexecon is of primary importance as a reaffirmation of the individuality that characterizes each plaintiff, especially the one who engages
in multidistrict litigation. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, this
notion had been swept aside in an effort to dispense of complex multidistrict cases in what was deemed to be the best means possible.
Among other things, efficiency was equated with uniformity of outcome. 162 The result was the inability of transferee judges to render
the justice due to each plaintiff. Yet uniformity of outcome is not coterminous with efficiency and it is far from being equivalent with fairness, even when plaintiffs appear to have suffered similar injuries. 163
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals cautioned in Johnson v. Celotex
Corp.1 64 that "[c]onsiderations of convenience and economy must
yield to a paramount concern for a fair and impartial trial."'1 6 5 Transferee judges exercising the self-transfer procedure lost sight of this
principle, choosing instead to view all plaintiffs similarly and then using this as a rationale for hanging on to cases so that they could dispose of them more quickly or compel resolution. 166 Lexecon restored
the right of the multidistrict plaintiff to trial in the forum of his choice
where he can be given the individual treatment to which Congress
believed he is entitled.
162 See In renAmerican Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d
1524, 1532 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[P]ermitting the transferee court to transfer a case to
itself upon completion of its pretrial work often promotes efficiency in the disposition
of the case or cases. The time required for a new judge to become acquainted with
the litigation is eliminated, as is the possibility of conflicting or duplicative rulings and
proceedings.").
163 See In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that although the plaintiffs had similar injuries and consolidation might increase
judicial efficiency, the plaintiffs had different occupations, they reported different
ailments, and there were different questions of causation).
164 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990).
165 Id.at 1285.
166 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. CIV.A. MDL 875, 1996 WL
539589r (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1996). In this motion for remand made by a group of
plaintifi under § 1407, the plaintiffs stated that they had been at an impasse in settlement negotiations for over three and one half years and did not anticipate settlement.
See id.at *2. The transferee judge denied the motion and rebuked the plaintiffs for
not cooperating enough so as to foster a settlement. See id. at *3. This case was still
not settled in 1997 when it appeared before the Supreme Court as Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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In the opinion of the Co-ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation, the major innovation of § 1407 was the fact that transfer of
multidistrict cases would be for pretrial purposes alone. 167 This would
68
preserve the "benefits of local trials in the appropriate districts.'
Among these benefits is the individual treatment of a plaintiff who
receives an adjudication of his case based upon the facts relevant to
him personally in the forum of his choice before a jury composed of
members of his community. 169 At some point in time, transferee
judges came to the conclusion that uniform outcomes were just outcomes. Because they believed that this was so, their goal was to ensure
uniform treatment of plaintiffs. Hence, this became part of the rationale for self-transfers. Yet the transferee judges overlooked the fact
that plaintiffs are often entitled to different outcomes.
One justification for different outcomes is the fact that our system
is federal, and "[i] t is in the nature of a federal system that different
states will apply different rules of law, based on their individual perceptions of what is in the best interests of their citizens."' 70 It may
seem counter-intuitive to apply different legal standards to plaintiffs
who have virtually identical injuries, or who were injured in the same
accident. However, in a federal system, "differences in where [plaintiffs] are from or where they were injured are relevant grounds for
distinguishing on matters still governed by state law."' 7 1 Consequently, remand to the transferor districts following the conclusion of
pretrial proceedings is necessary because the plaintiff is entitled to
adjudication of his individual case according to the law of his chosen
forum.
Plaintiffs may also be entitled to different outcomes due to the
nature and exigencies of multidistrict litigation itself. As one observer
notes, once the JPML has decided to transfer cases for consolidated
pretrial proceedings, "plaintiffs will inevitably file many new complaints.' 72 These additional plaintiffs may have far from meritorious
claims. In fact, "It has become almost axiomatic among plaintiffs'
counsel to put the good cases in state court and put the 'dogs' in the
MDL."'' 73 The results of this phenomenon can be mixed especially
167

See supra text accompanying notes 24-32.

168

See supra text accompanying note 29.

169 Ajury of fellow community members, that is, assuming that the plaintiff has
chosen to litigate in his home forum.
170 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 994 (2d Cir. 1980) (concluding that "uniformity is not prized for its own sake").
171 Kramer, supra note 137, at 580.
172 Herrnann, supra note 126, at 45.

173

Id.
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when the cases are adjudicated in a single aggregated trial. A meritorious plaintiff can potentially suffer as a result of the claims of other
plaintiffs which may be wholly specious. 17 4 He may be forced to share
in a settlement with claimants who have far weaker cases than his
own. 175 Conversely, he may be pulled down by the very presence of
these weaker cases and thereby receive nothing. 76 As a result of this
unfortunate reality, it is all the more imperative that a plaintiff-especially the plaintiff with an especially strong case-receive remand to
the transferor district where his claim can be adjudicated individually
on its merits rather than in an aggregate with claims that are weaker,
or perhaps even meritless.' 77 The plaintiff with the meritorious claim
who is precluded from bringing his action in state court may thus suffer additional injustice if his case is self-transferred for trial. Adherence to the remand mandate of § 1407 obviates problems such as
these and ensures the plaintiff of the individual treatment to which he
is entitled.' 7 8 In short, it ensures the preservation of fairness in a complex atmosphere where obfuscation of facts and issues can be prevalent. Congress prudently foresaw the wisdom of remand and was thus
unequivocal in its requirement. Lexecon has vindicated this foresight.

174

See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, TheEffects of OutlierPresence,Plain-

tiff PopulationSize, and Aggregation ofPlaintiffs on Simulated CivilJury Decisions,12 LAW &
209 (1988). The authors conducted an experiment "to determine the
effects of the size of the plaintiff population, the presence or absence of an outlier,
defined as a plaintiff whose injuries were significantly more severe than other plaintiffs, and whether plaintiffs were tried individually or were aggregated in a group." Id.
The authors found that when plaintiffs are aggregated, "a plaintiff with a relatively
weak case is definitely helped by aggregation; conversely, a plaintiff with a quite
strong case appears to be better served by being disaggregated, particularly with reference to punitive damages." It at 226.
175 See id, at 225 (finding that juries used their judgment of the outlier plaintiff as
a kind of threshold test whereby if liability was found, all of the plaintiffs benefited).
176 See id. ("In some juries the very severity of the outlier's injuries appeared to
raise a question of fault, in that doubt may have been cast on whether the [defendant] could be so venal as to cause such injuries in pursuit of profit. Indeed, juries that
did not find the [defendant] liable discussed the possibility that injuries as serious as
those described could not have been foreseeable.").
177 See Herrmann, supra note 126, at 45 (observing that if the transferee judge
"does not effectively fence out the dogs, the MDL proceeding threatens to become a
howling disaster").
178 See Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 69, 82 ("The plaintiffs [in mass tort trials] are no less deserving of and entitled to
full jury consideration of their case than are the victims of isolated torts.").
HUM. BEHAV.
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Final Thoughts on the PlaintiffAs an Individual

I have endeavored to demonstrate that there are both equitable
and practical concerns which, in addition to traditional notions concerning the individuality of litigation, justify our continued respect for
the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiffs engaged in multidistrict litigation. The argument is particularly difficult given the litigiousness of
our times. There is no denying that the federal courts are stretched
thin, and as a result, efficiency should be sought where it can be
achieved practicably. I have struggled with the fact that the majority
of the federal judiciary gave assent to the practice of self-transfer
which severely curtailed the rights of plaintiffs, not only to their
choice of forum, but sometimes even to their substantive rights.
These judges apparently believed that the practice did not result in a
serious abridgment of rights. In all deference to their experience, I
disagree. The rights of plaintiffs are interwoven with issues of fairness,
and fairness should be of paramount concern in the American system
of justice.
America holds itself out to the world as an example of the system
of government to which all nations should aspire. We believe that
government by democracy, that is, "rule by the people,' 79 creates that
cohesive social structure within which a citizenry is enabled to realize
its most fruitful, equitable, and beneficial potential. The ideas of democracy form the cornerstone of our foreign policy, and we ambitiously seek to export its tenets and foster its growth worldwide.
Furthermore, America's espousement of democracy has permitted it
to stand on a higher moral ground in the international arena. In light
of the foregoing, we ourselves must not lose sight of those fundamental components of democracy, without which our system is an empty
shell. The two components about which I am concerned here are fairness and participation.
Simply put, a democracy cannot function effectively if disparate
treatment is the norm and participation is rare; in many respects, the
former directly results in the latter. First, with regard to fairness, all
participants must be possessed of the same rights and must be accorded equal treatment; there is no "first among equals."18 0 Rather,
179 From the Greek noun ftioq (demos) "the people," and the verb KpaTEui
(krateo) "to rule." See HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH
LEXIcON 386, 991 (Henry Stuart Jones rev. 1968).
180 Primus interpares accurately describes the position of authority held by Caesar
Augustus at the inception of the Roman Empire. Augustus himself described his authority in his RES GESTAE Drvi AUGUSTI 34 in VELLEIUS PATERCULUS (Loeb Classical

Library, 1924) ("Post id tempus auctoritate omnibus praestiti; potestatis autem nihilo
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the rule of law prevails and-in theory-guarantees equality under
the law. Second, it is necessary for the citizenry to take an active part
in the democratic system of government lest its virtue be relegated to
meaninglessness. A democracy that suffers from a lack of participation is a democracy in name only.18 1 In contemporary American society, however, we see ever decreasing levels of participation which, I
believe, are largely the result of cynicism. This cynicism, in turn, is a
direct result of the erosion of fairness, or at least an erosion of the
belief that all are held to the same level of accountability under the
law. The end result is apathy and an overwhelming feeling of
powerlessness, both of which are anathema to an effective democracy.
I do not wish to sound trite or to broad brush this point by making outlandish assertions about a panacea that revolves solely around
the plaintiff having his day in court. Admittedly, the courts are often
abused by plaintiffs who have no business being in a courtroom, and
we want courts to be responsive to this abuse by screening out such
spurious claims. Yet likewise, it would be foolish to allow the system to
degenerate into a faceless, mass-adjudication machine that views all
plaintiffs the same and disregards the individual. To do so would further alienate a populace that already sees little need to involve itself in
a seemingly detached system of government. The courts are a public
resource and are accountable to the people who have "a right to insist
that their services not be squandered."' 8 2 But the courts are also accountable to the people who have a right to insist that they serve as a
vehicle for justice and for the righting of wrongs. Individual treatment of the individual plaintiff will, I believe, go a long way toward
enhancing faith in a system in which people will wish to participate.
This is a virtue that should not be lightly dismissed. Again, I do not
intend to make blanket statements concerning the fate of our democamplius habui quam ceteri qui mihi quoque in magistratu conlegae fuerunt.") ("After
that time (i.e., 27 B.C.) I surpassedall men in influence; but I held no greater power
[that is, legally constituted power] than those others who were my colleagues in each

magistracy.") (my tr-anslation).
181 Interestingly, our word "idiot" comes from the Greek noun iSUtLTYI; (idiotes)
meaning "a private person." See LIDDELL & ScoTr, supra note 179, at 819. This word
could be used to describe not only an ignorant and ill-informed man, but more importantly, a citizen who was so blind as to put his private interests above those of the
public, i.e., the citizenry. Simply put, a man whose self-interest eclipsed any regard
for the public good. Hence, the characterization could be not only unflattering, but
disparaging. For additional information concerning the etymology of the word, see
PIERRE CHANTRAINE, 1-2 DinoTNNAIRE ETYMOLOGIQUE DE LA LANGUE GRECQUE, 455
(1968). On this point, I thank Professor F.E. Romer, a classicist at the University of

Arizona, who discussed this question with me per litteras.
182 Freer, supra note 157, at 832.
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racy and the plaintiffs choice of forum. My intent is only to suggest
some issues for consideration with regard to the potential amendment
of § 1407.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Amendment of § 1407 to allow for the transfer of multidistrict
cases for consolidated trial would be a mistake. The lessons of the
past thirty years sufficiently affirm the wisdom that prevailed among
the Co-ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation and Congress
when § 1407 was drafted and approved. The Court's decision in Lexecon was a long overdue wake-up call to the federal transferee judges
who had subordinated the rights of plaintiffs to a perceived efficiency
that was both illusory and wholly impracticable. When it enacted
§ 1407, Congress was well aware of the limits of efficiency, and it recognized the dangers of exceeding these limits at the expense of plaintiffs' rights. It therefore struck a balance that would both achieve
efficiency and expediency in the context of multidistrict litigation,
and would retain the rights of plaintiffs which are necessary to fairness
and justice. The wisdom that characterized the decision of Congress
in 1968 is as valid today as it was then. Section 1407 should remain as
it is written for the benefit of all involved in multidistrict litigation.
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